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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2012, at a small surgical practice located outside of Chicago, an 
employee tried to log into the practice’s secure server, but instead was greeted by an 
odd message.
1
 The message stated that the data on the server, which included 
thousands of individual electronic health records and confidential emails, had been 
encrypted and could only be accessed by a password.
2
 That password would be 
provided, the message explained, for a fee.
3
 
On June 25, 2012, the Surgeons of Lake County, located in Libertyville, Illinois, 
became one of the latest victims of a growing phenomenon: electronic health record 
extortion.
4
 The ploy is simple. A hacker gains access to a large store of personal 
medical records on a “secure” server.5 The hacker simply removes or encrypts the 
                                                          
 Gordon R. Gantt, Jr. graduated from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in May 2014. He 
also holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Journalism from the Ohio State University. He wishes 
to thank his family, Prof. Gwendolyn Majette, and his wife Luisa for their endless 
encouragement and support. 
 1 Press Release, Surgeons of Lake Cnty., LLC, Incident Triggers Investigation as to 
Whether Patient Information May Have Been Improperly Accessed (July 20, 2012), available 
at http://www.send2press.com/newswire/2012-07-0720-001.shtml. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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data, then holds it for ransom.
6
 The thief does not break windows, kick in doors, or 
even have to leave the comfort of his own home. While sophisticated extortion 
scams are still rare,
7
 they are sober reminders of the vulnerability of the highly 
valuable and personal information patients share with their health care providers. 
Over the last few years, adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) increased.
8
 
In part, this is a result of increased pressure by regulators to adopt EHR technology 
to improve the efficiency and quality of medical care.
9
 In years to come, Medicare 
and Medicaid reimbursement will be determined in part by the provider’s use or non-
use of EHR.
10
 In the twenty-first century, it seems unlikely that government 
incentives would be necessary to spark interest in adopting new technology, but the 
health care industry lags behind other industries in terms of electronic records 
utilization.
11
 This is in part because of the unique character of the information 
contained in medical records. Protected Health Information (PHI) carries a 
substantial privacy interest because EHRs hold vast amounts of personal 
information; not only is a patient’s private medical history at risk, but names, 
addresses, birth dates, and social security numbers in electronic form are also 
vulnerable.
12
 That private data is collected with thousands, sometimes millions, of 
other patient records onto a single server.
13
 Many healthcare providers were reluctant 
to place electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI) in what they perceived to be 
the vulnerable, virtual realm.
14
 Ironically, this delay in conversion might have made 
ePHI even more susceptible. 
                                                          
 6 Id. 
 7 Neil Versel, Cyber Crooks Target Healthcare for Financial Data, INFO. WK. (Oct. 24, 
2012), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-privacy/cyber-crooks-target-
healthcare-for-finan/240009668. 
 8 Eric Jamoom et al., Physician Adoption of Electronic Health Record Systems: United 
States, 2011, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db98.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 9 Health IT Regulations Meaningful Use Regulations, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www. 
healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/meaningful-use-regulations (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Julie Gray, Modernizing Healthcare Communication: Medical Information When and 
Where You Need It, PEORIA MAG. (Feb. 2010), http://www.peoriamagazines.com/ibi/ 
2010/feb/modernizing-healthcare-communication. 
 12 What is the Difference Between a Personal Health Record, an Electronic Health 
Record, and an Electronic Medical Record?, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/ 
patients-families/faqs/what-difference-between-personal-health-record-and-electronic-health-
record-a (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).  
 13 See generally Breaches Affecting 500 or More People, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www. 
hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breach tool.html (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2014). 
 14 Vince Kuraitis, Overcoming the Penguin Problem: Setting Expectations for EHR 
Adoption, E-CARE MGMT. BLOG (Aug. 2, 2009), http://e-caremanagement.com/overcoming-
the-penguin-problem-setting-expectations-for-ehr-adoption/. Another issue, which compounds 
the practical concerns, is the “penguin problem” that Kuraitis focuses on in this article. The 
penguin problem is an economic phenomenon in which everyone in a given population waits 
for someone to be the first to adopt a new method or technology, so no one adopts the new 
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As the health care industry plays catch-up, it runs the risk of advancing too 
quickly and falling prey to a highly sophisticated population of hackers. While 
providers may feel the sting of regulators for failing to keep up with rapidly 
advancing online security norms, it is the patients that are the real victims. The 
breach at the Surgeons of Lake County was relatively small.
15
 Only a little over 
7,000 patient records were compromised in that case.
16
 But the numbers can run 
much higher. In March and April 2012, hackers breached the Utah Department of 
Health servers and gained access to roughly 800,000 individual electronic health 
records.
17
 
The rapid adoption of EHRs, to store and communicate highly personal data, 
raises serious concerns in terms of privacy, security, and civil and criminal liability. 
This note will examine the current statutory framework for addressing electronic 
breaches in the health care context, examine the vulnerabilities of EHRs, and look to 
the established world of online banking for possible legislative and practical 
solutions to the challenge of keeping private health information private. Finally, this 
note will propose key amendments to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations to enhance authentication security. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Medical records are the principal repository for a patient’s health and health care 
history.
18
 Traditionally, these records were paper documents that were passively 
used by providers for historical reference.
19
 EHR technology provides capabilities 
and improved efficiencies that paper records could never achieve.
20
 The ability to 
share patient information contained in EHRs promises to revolutionize the practice 
of medicine by turning what was once a historical reference into a tool that can 
proactively prevent harmful drug interactions and allergies, reduce the chances that a 
clinician’s orders will be misread or illegible, and facilitate the coordination of care 
across multiple providers.
21
 
The many benefits of EHR technology are inherently counterbalanced by the 
increased threat to patient privacy. As one scholar put it, “[a]s society has progressed 
and grown to new digital heights . . . it also has become more vulnerable to 
                                                          
method or technology. Kuratsis suggests that this phenomenon is a reason for the health care 
industry's slow adoption of EHR technology.  
 15 Health Information Privacy for the Surgeons of Lake County, U.S.  DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotification 
rule/breachtool.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (search “Surgeons of Lake County;” enter for 
state “Illinois;” then apply filter). 
 16 Id. 
 17 See HEALTHIT.GOV, supra note 13; see also, Patty Henetz, Utah Health Dept Chief: 
Hacked Data Stored Too Long, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 3, 2012), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/ 
news/54037017-78/health-security-department-patton.html.csp. 
 18 Eric S. Pasternack, HIPAA in the Age of Electronic Health Records, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 
817, 818 (2010). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 819. 
 21 Id.at 81921. 
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unwanted intrusions of privacy.”22 These intrusions negatively impact patient 
confidence in their providers’ ability to secure their private data.23 A survey by the 
National Partnership for Women and Families found that fifty-nine percent of 
patients who see a doctor that uses EHR technology feel that widespread adoption of 
EHR technology will lead to more personal information being lost or stolen.
24
 
The level of trust and comfort a patient has with his clinician has a direct 
relationship with the quality of care the patient receives.
25
 A breach of trust between 
a patient and clinician can result in irreparable physical harm to the patient.
26
 The 
amount of information a patient is willing to disclose to his or her clinician can 
impact the accuracy of diagnoses and the course of treatment recommended.
27
  Thus, 
patient/clinician trust is not just beneficial to quality care, but essential. 
A.  The Role of HIPAA 
Congress recognized the importance of patient information security to health care 
through the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
28
 
Despite its nebulous label, HIPAA’s most well-known provisions address the 
privacy and security of patient health information (PHI).
29
 The HIPAA privacy rule 
has three major purposes:  
1. To protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them 
access to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of 
that information; 2. To improve the quality of health care in the United 
States by restoring trust in the health care system among consumers, 
health care professionals, and the multitude of organizations and 
individuals committed to the delivery of care; and 3. To improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery by creating a national 
framework for health privacy protection that builds on efforts by states, 
health systems, and individual organizations and individuals.
30
 
These purposes are achieved by establishing a demanding federal standard for the 
electronic maintenance and storage of PHI.
31
 The Act applies only to “covered 
                                                          
 22 Varick D. Love, Privacy Ethics in Health Care, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, 
JulyAug. 2011, at 15. 
 23 Id. at 17. 
 24 Press Release, Nat’l P’ship for Women & Families, Making IT Meaningful: How 
Consumers Value and Trust Health IT is Unprecedented (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www. nationalpartnership.org/news-room/press-releases/with-government-
providing.html. 
 25 Audiey C. Kao et al., Patients’ Trust in their Physicians, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 681 
(1998), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1500897/. 
 26 Love, supra note 22, at 17. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Pasternack, supra note 18, at 818. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 825 n.71. 
 31 Id. 
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entities” which include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care 
providers that transmit PHI in electronic form.
32
 The general rule set forth by 
HIPAA is that covered entities must obtain patient authorization before releasing 
PHI. However, this otherwise simple rule is complicated by numerous exceptions 
that permit, or even compel, disclosure, even in the absence of such authorization.
33
 
Notably, HIPAA does not provide patients with a private cause of action for 
unlawful disclosure of PHI, but is instead enforced through civil and criminal 
proceedings originated by the Department of Health and Human Services and the 
Department of Justice.
34
  
Given the narrow scope and limited remedies provided in HIPAA, it has been 
criticized for focusing too much on patient consent and ignoring the technological 
realities presented by a growing number of non-covered entities that maintain 
electronic PHI.
35
 These criticisms may explain why Congress took additional action 
in 2009 through the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (HITECH).
36
 
B.  HITECH Amendments to HIPAA 
HITECH had two overarching purposes: (1) to incentivize the adoption of health 
information technology, including EHRs, and (2) to increase the privacy and security 
protections originally provided in HIPAA.
37
 To this end, HITECH makes federal 
funds immediately available to providers to help pay for EHR technology and to 
conduct training and education to develop the “best practices” of EHR utilization.38 
On the security side, the Act obligates covered entities to disclose breaches of EHRs 
to the individuals affected.
39
 A breach occurs when unsecured PHI is acquired, 
                                                          
 32 Id. at 82627. 
 33 Id. at 827. 
 34 Id. at 828, 83138, 84041. While HIPAA does not expressly provide a private cause of 
action, it has been successfully used for establishing a standard of care in tort claims for 
invasion of privacy, breach of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See 
Acosta v. Byrum, 638 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2006).  
 35 Pasternack, supra note 18, at 827. 
 36 See generally HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj, §§ 17901 (2012). 
 37 Lisa L. Dahm, Carrots and Sticks in the HITECH Act: Should Covered Entities Panic?, 
22 HEALTH LAW 1 (Aug. 2010).  
 38 Id. at 3. 
 39 Id at 4. As Dahm explains, once a covered entity discovers that a breach has occurred, it 
must notify the individuals whose PHI is involved “without unreasonable delay and in no case 
later than 60 [sixty] calendar days.”  Notice must be provided in writing and sent via first-class 
mail to each individual's last known address and must include: 
(1) A brief description of what happened, including the date of breach and the date of 
the discovery of the breach, if known; (2) A description of the types of unsecured 
protected health information that were involved in the breach (such as full name, 
Social Security number, date of birth, home address, account number, or disability 
code); (3) The steps individuals should take to protect themselves from potential harm 
resulting from the breach; (4) A brief description of what the covered entity involved 
is doing to investigate the breach, mitigate losses, and protect against any further 
breaches; (5) Contact procedures for individuals to ask questions or learn additional 
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accessed, used, or disclosed by an unauthorized individual and the privacy or 
security of the PHI is, or may be, compromised.
40
 HITECH also requires covered 
entities’ business associates to comply with HIPAA security regulations.41 
HITECH still does not provide for a private cause of action to those affected by 
data breaches; however, it does permit a state attorney general to bring a civil action 
on behalf of state residents to enjoin a violation of HITECH and to obtain statutory 
damages on behalf of affected residents.
42
 Generally, while HITECH provides some 
enhanced penalties
43
 and expands liability under the act to business associates and 
employees of covered entities, the Act is still narrowly tailored and forces affected 
individuals to rely on action by federal and state regulators to seek remedies for 
breaches of EHRs.
44
 
C.  HIPAA: The Final Rule 
On January 17, 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services released the 
long-awaited HIPAA final rule.
45
 The new rule officially adopted many of the 
changes called for in HITECH and the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act 
of 2008.
46
 According to HHS, the final rule “greatly enhances a patient’s privacy 
protections, provides individuals new rights to their health information, and 
strengthens the government’s ability to enforce the law”.47 The final rule became 
effective on March 23, 2013, but covered entities and their business associates had 
until September 23, 2013, to come into full compliance with its new requirements.48 
 Among the final rule’s most prominent features is the complete replacement 
of the Breach Notification rule as set forth in the interim final rule, the extension of 
                                                          
information, which shall include a toll-free telephone number, an email address, web 
site, or postal address. Id.  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See HITECH Act, Section 13410(e)(1)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17939(e)(1) (2012)).  
 43 See HITECH Act, Section 13410(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17939(a) (2012)). 
 44 Devin D.Vinson, No More Paper Tiger: Promise and Peril as HIPAA Goes HITECH, 
30 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 28 (2011). 
 45 Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. New rule protects patient privacy, 
secures health information (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/ 
2013pres/01/20130117b.html. A final rule is obtained after a proposed rule is put forth by a 
regulatory agency. Proposed rules are subjected to public comment from a variety of 
stakeholders. Those public comments are reviewed by the administrative agency and any 
suggestions for modification of the rule contained in those comments are considered and 
sometimes adopted in the final rule. 
 46 Id. The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) provides 
individuals with increased protection against disclosure of genetic information and 
specifically prohibits the use or disclosure of genetic information by health insurers for 
underwriting purposes. Final rule provisions related to GINA do not alter or add to technical 
security safeguards and thus are not relevant to this article. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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liability for breaches to business associates and the dramatic increase in civil 
monetary penalties.
49
 The final rule provides the following summary of its major 
provisions: 
“This omnibus final rule is comprised of the following four final rules: 
1. Final modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement 
Rules mandated by the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, and certain other modifications to 
improve the Rules, which were issued as a proposed rule on July 14, 
2010. These modifications: 
Make business associates of covered entities directly liable for 
compliance with certain of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules' 
requirements. 
Strengthen the limitations on the use and disclosure of protected 
health information for marketing and fundraising purposes, and prohibit 
the sale of protected health information without individual authorization. 
Expand individuals' rights to receive electronic copies of their health 
information and to restrict disclosures to a health plan concerning 
treatment for which the individual has paid out of pocket in full. 
Require modifications to, and redistribution of, a covered entity's 
notice of privacy practices. 
Modify the individual authorization and other requirements to 
facilitate research and disclosure of child immunization proof to schools, 
and to enable access to decedent information by family members or 
others. 
Adopt the additional HITECH Act enhancements to the Enforcement 
Rule not previously adopted in the October 30, 2009, interim final rule 
(referenced immediately below), such as the provisions addressing 
enforcement of noncompliance with the HIPAA Rules due to willful 
neglect. 
2. Final rule adopting changes to the HIPAA Enforcement Rule to 
incorporate the increased and tiered civil money penalty structure 
provided by the HITECH Act, originally published as an interim final rule 
on October 30, 2009. 
3. Final rule on Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health 
Information under the HITECH Act, which replaces the breach 
notification rule's “harm” threshold with a more objective standard and 
supplants an interim final rule published on August 24, 2009. 
4. Final rule modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule as required by the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) to prohibit most 
health plans from using or disclosing genetic information for underwriting 
purposes, which was published as a proposed rule on October 7, 2009.”50 
III.  DISCUSSION 
HIPAA seems far removed from the practical realities of modern EHR 
utilization. While attacks on health care entities are still relatively rare, hackers are 
                                                          
 49 78 C.F.R. § 5566 (2013). 
 50 Id.  
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stealing ePHI at an ever increasing rate, leaving patients vulnerable to identity theft 
and, perhaps more importantly, loss of control over highly sensitive Protected Health 
Information.
51
 The threat posed by hackers is a symptom of institutional security 
failure.
52
 Hackers gain access to PHI through system vulnerabilities.53 As a security 
issue, examination of these issues requires careful analysis of the HIPAA Security 
Rule and, more specifically, the technical standards it requires. In order to 
understand how to better protect ePHI, it is first necessary to understand the nature 
of the threat and the current required safeguards. The remedy will be found where 
current safeguards fail to address the threat. 
A.  The Nature of the Threat 
In recent months, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has expressed 
concerns that the health care systems present an inviting target to activist hackers, 
cyber warriors, criminals, and terrorists.
54
 DHS has found that the same type of 
trivial security flaws which hackers have exploited in the financial, defense, and 
private business sectors still exist in the health care industry and are going 
uncorrected.
55
 
Not only are there a swarm of foreign and domestic hackers threatening all forms 
of electronic data, but there are several new ways to remotely access that data.
56
 Cell 
phones, laptops, and tablets have become popular tools in the health care field.
57
 For 
example, the Apple iPad features an electronic charting application called 
                                                          
 51 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Health-Care Sector Vulnerable to Hackers, Researchers Say, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/health-care-
sector-vulnerable-to-hackers-researchers-say/2012/12/25/72933598-3e50-11e2-ae43-
cf491b837f7b_story.html (This article was the culmination of a year-long investigation by the 
Washington Post. The investigators determined that the health care industry is among the most 
vulnerable industries in terms of cyber security. Avi Rubin, a computer scientist and technical 
director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University, told the 
Washington Post “[i]f our financial industry regarded security the way the health-care sector 
does, I would stuff my cash in a mattress under my bed.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 HEALTHIT.GOV, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION 13, http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/privacy/ 
privacy-and-security-guide.pdf. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Abigail Philips, Microsoft Surface Enters mHealth Market, HEALTHCARE GLOBAL 
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.healthcareglobal.com/healthcare_technology/microsoft-surface-
enters-mhealth-market; see also Scott Mace, How Tablets are Influencing Healthcare, 
HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (March 6, 2013), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-2/TEC-
289831/How-Tablets-are-Influencing-Healthcare.  
 57 See Eric Wicklund, mHealth in the Exhibit Hall: It’s No Longer All About the Shiny 
New Toys, HEALTHCAREIT NEWS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/ 
news/mhealth-exhibit-hall-its-no-longer-all-about-shiny-new-toys; see generally Susan 
Standing & Craig Standing, Mobile Technology and Healthcare: The Adoption Issues and 
Systemic Problems, 4 INT’L J. ELECTRONIC HEALTH CARE 221, 22135 (2008), available at 
http://inderscience.metapress.com/content/071725p701448111/.  
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“DrChrono” which its developer claims meets Stage-1 Meaningful Use under 
HITECH.
58
 The application allows providers to transmit medical billing information, 
transmit electronic prescriptions, and share EKG, X-Ray, and lab results all from the 
iPad.
59
 These portable devices are certainly more convenient and provide users with 
numerous benefits that have the potential to improve the quality of care, but as soon 
as these devices come out hackers develop new ways to subvert their security 
measures.
60
 The answer can’t be to abandon these new technologies, but rather to 
make them more secure with improved security standards that are already 
implemented in other industries. 
While it is nearly impossible to stop a sophisticated hacker who is determined to 
gain access to a healthcare network, many of the current security practices in place 
are so sub-standard that even a hacker with relatively low-skill can gain access. The 
University of Chicago Medical Center, for example, found that multiple resident 
physicians were using a single password to access an online dropbox used to manage 
patient care.
61
 Worse still, the password was published in an online manual.
62
 After 
the media brought the vulnerability to the medical center’s attention, it took steps to 
resolve the problem.
63
 Unfortunately, the Office of Civil Rights website is filled with 
examples of such vulnerabilities which are being discovered too late.
64
 
Even by curing this low hanging fruit through improved administrative security 
measures, the threat from more sophisticated attacks remains. In the Information 
Age, these threats come from around the globe.
65
 They can even be highly 
coordinated among multiple hackers as demonstrated by the now famous hacking 
organization known as “Anonymous” which uses social media and websites to plan 
large scale attacks on various businesses, groups, and governments.
66
 
Protecting ePHI from these hackers is a constant technological arms race. As 
quickly as new cutting edge barriers are put up, someone is figuring out how to tear 
                                                          
 58 See DRCHRONO INC.,  https://drchrono.com/ipad_ehr/ (last visited March 7, 2013). 
 59 Id. 
 60 See, e.g., Nate Hoffelder, Got 5 Seconds? Why Not Hack an IPad 2, MEDIA BISTRO 
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.mediabistro.com/appnewser/got-5-seconds-why-not-hack-an-
ipad-2_b17008. 
 61 O’Harrow, supra note 51.  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 The HIPAA final rule, published by HHS on January 18, 2013, incorporates the 
HITECH Act’s mandatory breach notification for breaches of ePHI that affect 500 or more 
patients. A running list of these breaches is published in accordance with section 13402(e)(4) 
of the HITECH Act and is available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/ 
breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html.  
 65 Cyber Threat Warnings Grow Louder, FCW (Aug. 15, 2012), http://fcw.com/articles/ 
2012/08/15/buzz-cyber-threat.aspx?m=2. 
 66 James Schmidt, What is ‘Anonymous’?, EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/what-is-anonymous. 
2014]   HACKING HEALTH CARE: AUTHENTIFICATION SECURITY 241 
 
 
 
them down.
67
 At the same time healthcare IT professionals are trying to keep 
unauthorized users out, there is a growing trend toward making electronic medical 
records available to patients online.
68
 
B.  The Value of the Threatened Information 
Part of the reason ePHI is so sensitive is that it may contain details about a 
person’s health history and that information might be embarrassing or be perceived 
to negatively impact the person’s ability to gain employment or insurance, but one of 
the primary reasons hackers target EHRs is for financial information.
69
 Hackers are 
looking for information from which they can directly or indirectly profit.
70
 HIPAA 
provides a detailed list of the sort of information that must be removed or redacted 
from EHRs in order to consider the record “de-identified.”71 De-identification is not 
at issue in this note, but the list does illustrate the range of information often found 
in EHRs. The list includes: 
(A) Names; 
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street 
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, 
except for the initial three digits of a zip code if, according to the current 
publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census: 
(1) The geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with the same 
three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and 
(2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic units 
containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000. 
(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an 
individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of 
death; and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including year) 
indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may be 
aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older; 
(D) Telephone numbers; 
                                                          
 67 Richard Barber, Managing X-Commerce: The Importance of a Security Based 
Architecture When Preparing for E-Commerce, May 2001, at 912, available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353485801005141#.  
 68 See Pasternack, supra note 18; see also Steve Lohr, Google to End Health Records 
Service After it Fails to Attract Users, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/06/25/technology/25health.html?_r=0. Google Health was a major attempt by a 
prominent developer to provide patients with online access to ePHI. Launched in 2008, the 
goal of the service was to translate their consumer-centered approach, which was successfully 
applied to other domains, to the health care industry and to impact the day-to-day health 
experiences of its users. Despite nearly three years of effort and the strength of its brand, 
Google Health was abandoned in the beginning of 2012. The complexity of the service and 
the laborious task of putting health information into the system discouraged wide adoption, 
and the service failed to have the large impact the company had envisioned. Still, it seems 
inevitable that consumer-driven EHRs will find a place in the market and become as 
ubiquitous as online banking. 
 69 Versel, supra note 7. 
 70 45 CFR § 164.514(d)(2)(i) (2013). 
 71 Id. 
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(E) Fax numbers; 
(F) Electronic mail addresses; 
(G) Social security numbers; 
(H) Medical record numbers; 
(I) Health plan beneficiary numbers; 
(J) Account numbers; 
(K) Certificate/license numbers; 
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate 
numbers; 
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers; 
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); 
(O) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; 
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; 
(Q) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and 
(R) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except 
as permitted by paragraph (c) of this section; 
Valuable financial data is often what draws hackers to healthcare records, but 
health and financial information is often not segmented from other types of 
information.
72
 In other words, patients who have their EHRs hacked run the risk of 
not only having their identity stolen, but also of having their private medical history 
compromised. The value of personal medical history extends even beyond the 
individual whose ePHI has been exposed by a breach due to the genetic information 
that can often be found in those records.
73
 
C.  HIPAA Security Requirements 
In this fast moving environment, slow-moving and narrowly tailored regulation is 
a poor defensive strategy. Instead, HHS created rules based on the fundamental 
concepts of flexibility, scalability, and technology neutrality.
74
 HIPAA does not 
identify specific security measures to implement, but a covered entity is permitted to 
use any security measures that allow it to “reasonably and appropriately” implement 
                                                          
 72 Versel, supra note 7. 
 73 Kristen Carl, It’s Personal: Privacy Concerns Associated with Personal Health 
Records, 5 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 533 (2010). As Carl elucidates,  
[m]edical records arguably contain a person's most sensitive and private information. 
Because many medical conditions are hereditary, a single medical record may include 
equally sensitive information about countless other individuals. The damaging effects 
brought on by a breach in the security of this information are endless. Third parties - 
employers, bankers, neighbors - could use this information to discriminate against and 
potentially ostracize an individual diagnosed with an “unpopular” disease or 
condition. With the development and rising popularity of the online “personal health 
record” through mediums such as Google Health and Microsoft HealthVault, two 
important questions arise: (1) is storing medical information online safe and securely 
protected; and, (2) in the event of a breach, whom does the law hold accountable? 
 
Id. 
 74 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Security Standards: Technical Safeguards, 
HIPAA SECURITY SERIES, May 2005 (rev. March 2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/ 
privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/techsafeguards.pdf 
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the standards and implementation specifications.
75
 These regulations are set forth in 
the HIPAA Security Rule.
76
 Whether a particular measure is “reasonable and 
appropriate” is determined through a multi-factor analysis provided in the security 
rule.77 The factors include: 
(i) The size, complexity, and capabilities of the covered entity. 
(ii) The covered entity's technical infrastructure, hardware, and software 
security capabilities. 
(iii) The costs of security measures. 
(iv) The probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic 
protected health information.
78
 
HIPAA appears to, and was in fact designed to, permit substantial discretion on 
the part of the covered entity in determining what specific measures to take.79 Of 
course, once a breach occurs this lack of direction makes the covered entity’s task of 
defending its security measures that much more complex and arbitrary.
80
 If the 
covered entity is able to determine that it is subject to the required implementations 
based on this nebulous multi-factor test, then it must implement the equally 
                                                          
 75 Id. 
 76 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (2013). This rule provides in relevant part:  
(a) General requirements. Covered entities must do the following: (1) Ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health information 
the covered entity creates, receives, maintains, or transmits; (2) Protect against any 
reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such 
information; (3) Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such 
information that are not permitted or required under subpart E of this part. (4) Ensure 
compliance with this subpart by its workforce. 
 77 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2) (2013). 
 78 Id. 
 79 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2013). 
 80 Farrokh Alemi, Privacy and Confidentiality, HEALTH SYSTEMS ADMIN., 
http://gunston.gmu.edu/healthscience/740/HIPAA.asp?E=0 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
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enigmatic administrative,
81
 physical,
82
 and technical
83
 safeguards as well as 
organizational,
84
 policies, procedures, and documentation
85
 requirements. 
The administrative safeguards require the covered entity to conduct an “accurate 
and thorough” risk analysis.86 Covered entities must then address those risks through 
                                                          
 81 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2013) describes the administrative safeguards and implementation 
procedures a covered entity must enact including risk analysis, security management 
processes,  sanction policies, information system activity reviews, and workforce security, 
among many others. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2013). Consult 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2013) for a 
full list of requirements.     
 82 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2013) describes the physical safeguards and implementation 
procedures a covered entity must enact including facility access controls, device and media 
controls, disposal policies, and data backup and storage policies. 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2013).   
 83 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2013) describes the technical safeguards and implementation 
procedures a covered entity must enact including unique user identification, automatic logoff, 
emergency access procedures, and audit controls, among many others. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 
(2013) .  
 84 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2013) sets forth the organizational requirements for covered 
entities and their relationships with agents, employees, governmental entities, and other 
parties. 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2013).   
 85 45 C.F.R. § 164.316 (2013).  
A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: 
(a) Standard: Policies and procedures. Implement reasonable and appropriate policies 
and procedures to comply with the standards, implementation specifications, or other 
requirements of this subpart, taking into account those factors specified in § 
164.306(b)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). This standard is not to be construed to permit or 
excuse an action that violates any other standard, implementation specification, or 
other requirements of this subpart. A covered entity may change its policies and 
procedures at any time, provided that the changes are documented and are 
implemented in accordance with this subpart. 
(b)(1) Standard: Documentation. 
(i) Maintain the policies and procedures implemented to comply with this subpart in 
written (which may be electronic) form; and 
(ii) If an action, activity or assessment is required by this subpart to be documented, 
maintain a written (which may be electronic) record of the action, activity, or 
assessment. 
(2) Implementation specifications: 
(i) Time limit (Required). Retain the documentation required by paragraph (b)(1) of 
this section for 6 years from the date of its creation or the date when it last was in 
effect, whichever is later. 
(ii) Availability (Required). Make documentation available to those persons 
responsible for implementing the procedures to which the documentation pertains. 
(iii) Updates (Required). Review documentation periodically, and update as needed, in 
response to environmental or operational changes affecting the security of the 
electronic protected health information. 
45 C.F.R. § 164.316 (2013).  
 86 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2013). Specifically, the risk analysis is limited to 
potential vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI. Id. 
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the implementation of “sufficient” security measures,87 and apply an “appropriate” 
sanction policy to its workforce in the event of non-compliance with the covered 
entity's security policies and procedures.
88
 Finally, the covered entity must conduct 
“regular” reviews of its information systems activity, including audit logs, access 
reports, and security incident tracking reports.
89
 
Physical safeguards require the covered entity to limit access to electronic 
information systems to authorized users through policies and procedures regarding 
use and receipt and removal of electronically stored data, as well as physical 
safeguards.
90
 Specifically, the covered entity must implement policies and 
procedures for disposal and removal of PHI prior to media re-use.
91
  
The technical safeguards required of a covered entity include the access controls 
for ePHI, such as unique user identification and a procedure for obtaining access to 
ePHI in the event of an emergency.
92
 Covered entities must also implement audit 
controls which record and examine user activity with ePHI
93
 and policies and 
procedures which prevent the unauthorized alteration or destruction of PHI.
94
 Person 
or entity authentication procedures are required to ensure that the person or entity 
seeking access is actually authorized.
95
 Finally, the covered entity is required to 
implement technical safeguards to ensure the secure transmission of ePHI over a 
communications network.
96
 
The organizational requirements under HIPAA require a contractual agreement 
between a covered entity and business associate.
97
 The terms of that agreement bind 
the business associate to the same security and privacy standards as the covered 
entity.
98
 Notably, under these organizational requirements the covered entity is 
                                                          
 87 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (2013). Sufficiency in this case is determined by the application 
of general requirements outlined in 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a). 
 88 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) (2013). 
 89 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) (2013). 
 90 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(1) (2013). 
 91 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2) (2013). An example of re-useable media is a re-writable 
compact disk or flash drive. In order for these items to be re-used, existing PHI must be 
removed to ensure existing ePHI is not needlessly disclosed when the media device is re-used. 
 92 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a) (2013). Access control requirements under the technical 
safeguard provisions must limit access to those who are granted access rights as specified in 
45 C.F.R. §164.308(a)(4). 
 93 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b) (2013). 
 94 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(c)(1) (2013). 
 95 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(d) (2013). 
 96 45 C.F.R. § § 164.312(e)(1) (2013). 
 97 45 C.F.R. § 164.314(a)(1) (2013). 
 98 Id. Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 
2009, which amended HIPAA, a business associate of a covered entity is held to HIPAA 
standards regardless of the terms or even existence of a written agreement. This rule was also 
adopted in the HIPAA final rule released on Jan. 17, 2013. See Modifications to the HIPAA 
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the HITECH Act and 
the GINA, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013). The rule explains the analysis for determining if 
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considered to be in violation if the business associate breaches the contract by failing 
to meet those standards and the covered entity fails to take “reasonable” steps to cure 
that breach.
99
 
Finally, the covered entity is required to implement certain policy, procedure, 
and documentation standards.
100
 Consistent with the rest of the regulation, the 
policies and procedures implemented must be “reasonable and appropriate” for the 
covered entity to remain in compliance.
101
 All policies and procedures must be 
documented and maintained for no less than six years from the date of their creation 
or the date when they were put into effect, whichever is later.
102
 The documents must 
then be made available to the persons responsible for implementation and updated in 
response to any environmental and operational changes that affect the security of 
ePHI.
103
 
                                                          
an agent meets a business associate standard as follows, “[a]n analysis of whether a business 
associate is an agent will be fact specific, taking into account the terms of a business associate 
agreement as well as the totality of the circumstances involved in the ongoing relationship 
between the parties.” Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach 
Notification Rules Under the HITECH Act and the GINA, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013). 
 99 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)(ii) (2013).   
(ii) A covered entity is not in compliance with the standards in § 164.502(e) and 
paragraph (a) of this section if the covered entity knew of a pattern of an activity or 
practice of the business associate that constituted a material breach or violation of the 
business associate's obligation under the contract or other arrangement, unless the 
covered entity took reasonable steps to cure the breach or end the violation, as 
applicable, and, if such steps were unsuccessful-- 
(A) Terminated the contract or arrangement, if feasible; or 
(B) If termination is not feasible, reported the problem to the Secretary. 
 
Id. 
 100 45 C.F.R. § 164.316 (2013). 
 101 Id. The reasonableness is determined through the flexibility approach set forth in 45 
C.F.R. § 164.306(b): 
(b) Flexibility of approach. 
(1) Covered entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to 
reasonably and appropriately implement the standards and implementation 
specifications as specified in this subpart. 
(2) In deciding which security measures to use, a covered entity must take into 
account the following factors: 
(i) The size, complexity, and capabilities of the covered entity. 
(ii) The covered entity's technical infrastructure, hardware, and software security 
capabilities. 
(iii) The costs of security measures. 
(iv) The probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic protected health 
information. 
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2013). 
 102 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.316(a)(1)(ii)164.316(b)(2)(1) (2013). 
 103 45 C.F.R. § 164.316(b)(2) (2013). 
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The Security Rule measures paint a rough outline for covered entities to follow.  
That outline is further complimented by a myriad of so-called “addressable”104 
measures.
105
 The addressable measures are not required unless an assessment by the 
covered entity reveals the measures to be “reasonable and appropriate”106 in the 
entity’s environment when analyzed with reference to the likely contribution to the 
protection of ePHI.
107
 Among those “addressable” measures is the requirement to 
have ePHI encrypted whenever it is transmitted electronically.
108
 The standard 
provided within the technical safeguard requirements is merely to implement 
“technical measures” to guard against unauthorized access of ePHI.109 
When HITECH was unveiled as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, it provided additional actions by covered entities once a 
breach had occurred, but HITECH did not require the implementation of more 
rigorous initial security measures than were required originally under HIPAA.
110
 
Although, the new rules under HITECH did impose substantially harsher civil and 
criminal penalties for covered entities whose non-compliance results in breaches of 
ePHI.
111
 
D.  Federal Security Standards in the Financial Industry 
Electronic banking information carries a similar expectation of privacy to ePHI 
and can offer guidance in formatting a workable security standard. Like the health 
care industry, the financial industry requires the electronic storage and regular 
transfer of confidential information among various entities.112 A key difference 
between the two industries is that the financial services industry is leaps and bounds 
ahead of the health care industry in terms of remote access and management of 
personal financial information.113 
Online security standards in the financial services industry are promulgated by 
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), an interagency 
council that is charged with producing standards and guidance for electronic 
financial data security.
114
 FFIEC was created as part of the Federal Institutions 
                                                          
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(i) (2013). 
 108 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2013). 
 109 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2013). 
 110 Howard Anderson, HITECH Stage 2 Rules Unveiled, DATA BREACH TODAY (Aug. 23, 
2012), http://www.databreachtoday.com/hitech-stage-2-rules-unveiled-a-5060. 
 111 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 160; 45 C.F.R. § 164. 
 112 O’Harrow, supra note 51. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Paul Rice, Civil Liability Theories For Insufficient Security Authentication in Online 
Banking, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 439, 442 (2012). As Rice explains, 
The financial services sector falls under a complex web of federal and state 
regulations designed to govern operations and customer information protection. At the 
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Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act in March of 1979.
115
 The agencies 
represented by the council are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National 
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
116
  
In 1999, The FFIEC implemented section 501(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act. This section required FFIEC member agencies to: 
establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to 
their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards (1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information; (2) to protect against any anticipated threats or 
hazards to the security or integrity of such records; and (3) to protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information 
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any 
customer.
117
 
In response to this general call for action, the FFIEC developed security 
standards similar to those provided in HIPAA. The FFIEC “IT Examination 
                                                          
highest level, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System sets the overall 
monetary policy for the United States. The activities of a financial services company 
determine which regulatory body provides oversight. A bank will often fall under 
several regulatory programs based on the bank's charter and services it offers. 
Different federal agencies regulate banks offering traditional checking and savings 
accounts depending on the nature of the bank's charter. Nationally chartered banks fall 
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the 
Comptroller for Currency (OCC). Credit unions and state chartered banks fall under 
the review National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The FDIC insures deposits 
held in traditional personal checking and savings accounts. 
 
Id. 
 115 About the FFIEC, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm. 
 116 Id. 
 117 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). This section provides in relevant part, 
 [i]t is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and 
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security 
and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information. 
(b) Financial institutions safeguards 
In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section, each agency or authority 
described in section 6805(a) of this title, other than the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection, shall establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to 
their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards-- 
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information; 
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of 
such records; and 
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information 
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer. 
 
Id. 
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Handbook” details those standards and sets forth a multi-step security process to 
identify and address security needs within a financial institution based on its 
resources.
118
 Among those are a series of security controls comparable to the 
administrative, physical, and technical safeguards provided in HIPAA.
119
 However, 
there are a number of key differences from which the health care industry may be 
able to glean valuable lessons for improving security without impeding access. 
One of the key distinctions is in the area of user authentication. In 2001, the 
FFIEC published a new set of guidelines for the financial services industry titled 
“Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment.”120 This initial guidance 
focused on risk management controls necessary to authenticate the identity of retail 
and commercial customers accessing internet-based financial services.
121
 Changing 
law and technology, paired with increasing instances of fraud and identity theft from 
data breaches, prompted the council to update its authentication guidance in 2005.
122
 
The guidance reiterated its previous risk assessment framework, but also took an 
important leap in explaining what type of user authentication protections will be 
considered sufficient.
123
 
The FFIEC determined that single factor authentication was no longer sufficient 
protection.
124
 Single factor authentication is the practice of authenticating the 
identity of a user using only a username and password.
125
 The FFIEC guidelines now 
require institutions to use a three-factor methodology: something the user knows 
(e.g., a password), something the user has (e.g., an ATM or debit card), and 
something the user is (e.g., a biometric feature like a fingerprint or retinal scan).
126
 
The guidelines require the implementation of at least two of the three to meet 
                                                          
 118 FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK: INFORMATION 
SECURITY (2006), available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/ITBooklets/FFIEC_ITBooklet_ 
InformationSecurity.pdf. The process includes several steps: risk assessment, security strategy 
development, security controls implementation, security monitoring, and security process 
monitoring and updating. This detailed security process provides guidance to financial 
institutions with a clear road for determining what safeguards should be implemented to 
ensure the security of customer information. However, since it is only designed to evaluate a 
single entity’s unique security needs, a full overview is omitted from this Note. 
 119 Id. at 4. 
 120 FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET BANKING 
ENVIRONMENT, available at http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf.   
 121 Id. 
 122 Id.  
 123 Id. 
 124 Rice, supra note 114, at 445. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 44546. 
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compliance standards.
127
 Further, the multi-factor authentication cannot feature two 
steps from the same category. 
128
 
Guidance literature regarding HIPAA authentication standards demonstrates a 
clear preference for three-factor methodology, but falls short of actually requiring 
that methodology to be used when accessing ePHI.
129
 Multi-factor authentication 
plays a key role in ePHI security as simple password protection is so easily 
usurped.
130
 The lack of a hard rule requiring multi-factor authentication only makes 
ePHI a more alluring target for savvy hackers who know that huge stores of valuable 
health and financial information are just a string of characters away. Thus, as 
financial institutions apply layered authentication, hospital and insurance networks 
may make for more vulnerable prey. 
The FFIEC also recommends the use of a highly sophisticated authentication 
system called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
131
 The FFIEC handbook describes 
PKI as follows: 
The system is based on public key cryptography in which each user has a 
key pair-a unique electronic value called a public key and a 
mathematically related private key.  The public key is made available to 
those who need to verify the user’s identity. 
 The private key is stored on the user's computer or a separate device 
such as a smart card.  When the key pair is created with strong encryption 
                                                          
 127 Id. at 446. 
 128 Id. For example, an authentication process which required a user to enter a user name 
and password and then answer a personal question would not be sufficient protection under 
these standards.  
 129 Security Standards, supra note 74, at 9. This HHS publication states, 
 [i]n general, authentication ensures that a person is in fact who he or she claims to be 
before being allowed to access EPHI. This is accomplished by providing proof of 
identity. There are a few basic ways to provide proof of identity for authentication. A 
covered entity may: 
i.  Require something known only to that individuals, such as a password or PIN. 
ii.  Require something that the individuals possess, such as a smart car, a token, or a 
key. 
iii. Require something unique to the individual such as a biometric. Examples of 
biometrics include fingerprints, voice patterns, facial patterns or iris patterns. 
Most covered entities use one of the first two methods of authentication. Many small 
provider offices rely on a password or PIN to authenticate the user. If the 
authentication credentials entered into an information system math those stored in that 
system, the user is authenticated. Once Properly Authenticated, the user is granted the 
authorized access privileges to perform functions and access EPHI. Although the 
password is the most common way to obtain authentication in an information system 
and the easiest to establish, covered entities may want to explore other authentication 
methods. 
 
Id.  
 130 Matt Honan, Kill the Password: Why a String of Characters Can’t Protect Us Anymore, 
WIRED MAG. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/11/ff-mat-honan-
password-hacker/all/. 
 131 FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 26. 
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algorithms and input variables, the probability of deriving the private key 
from the public key is extremely remote. The private key must be stored 
in encrypted text and protected with a password or PIN to avoid 
compromise or disclosure.  The private key is used to create an electronic 
identifier called adigital signature that uniquely identifies the holder of the 
private key and can only be authenticated with the corresponding public 
key. 
 The certificate authority (CA), which may be the financial institution 
or its service provider, plays a key role by attesting with a digital 
certificate that a particular public key and the corresponding private key 
belongs to a specific user or system. It is important when issuing a digital 
certificate that the registration process for initially verifying the identity 
of users is adequately controlled.  The CA attests to the individual user's 
identity by signing the digital certificate with its own private key, known 
as the root key.  Each time the user establishes a communication link with 
the financial institution's systems, a digital signature is transmitted with a 
digital certificate.  These electronic credentials enable the institution to 
determine that the digital certificate is valid, identify the individual as a 
user, and confirm that transactions entered into the institution's computer 
system were performed by that user.
132
 
The complexity of the PKI framework is what makes it such a highly effective 
security measure.
133
 The main benefit of PKI is that it allows for the secure access of 
data on a public network and reliably identifies the user accessing the data.
134
 Of 
course, the implementation of such complex authentication security measures raises 
one of the fundamental issues of electronic data security: the trade-offs.
135
 The 
reality of increased security is that it almost always comes at the cost of 
convenience.
136
 In the health care context, where time is often of the essence, 
inconvenience can quickly escalate into a danger to the patient’s health.137 So, the 
security rules for both financial institutions and health care entities are drafted to 
allow for some flexibility by requiring each entity to conduct a risk assessment to 
determine the most reasonable security measures given the entity’s risks and 
                                                          
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 CARLISLE ADAMS & STEVE LLOYD, UNDERSTANDING PKI: CONCEPTS, STANDARDS, AND 
DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 11–15 (2003). 
 135 Honan, supra note 130. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Michael J. Schull at al., The Effect of Low-Complexity Patients on Emergency 
Department Wait Times, 49 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 257 (2007), available at 
http://www.camconnect.org/member/documents/LowComplexityER.pdf. 
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resources.
138
 This flexibility has been criticized by entities looking for more concrete 
answers to the ever-present question: what are the expectations?
139
 
A perfect example of the necessity of a flexible standard is regulation on 
encryption measures. Encryption utilizes a fixed algorithm to convert electronic data 
into an incomprehensible code that can only be broken with the use of a variable 
known as a “key.”140 The FFIEC recognizes the following three types of encryption: 
the cryptographic hash, symmetric encryption, and asymmetric encryption.
141
 
Cryptographic hash encryption encodes data by reducing the variable length of 
input data into a fixed length input data.
142
 Hashes are placed in the code and used to 
verify the file and message integrity.
143
 A cryptographic hash system also uses 
hashes to encrypt the password that activates the key to unlock the code.
144
 Of 
course, this is not a perfect system and is susceptible to dictionary (or “brute force”) 
attacks wherein a hacker feeds all possible combinations into the algorithm to 
deduce the password and decrypt the data.
145
 
Symmetric encryption also involves the use of a fixed algorithm and key, but 
unlike cryptographic hash, symmetric encryption is a two-way encryption in which 
both the creator and the reader use the same key and algorithm to encrypt and 
decrypt.
146
 Since the key is the same for both the creator and the reader, this system 
relies on the secrecy of the key.
147
 If the key is compromised, a hacker can gain 
access to the data and wreak the sort of havoc experienced by the Surgeons of Lake 
County. 
Asymmetric encryption, which serves as the basis of PKI authentication, creates 
two distinct but mathematically related keys for the creator and reader.
148
 Just as in 
PKI, these two keys are called the “public” and “private” keys.149 The reader key 
                                                          
 138 See generally 45 C.F.R. 164.308(a)(1) (2013); See also FEDERAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 7. 
 139 John Moehrke, Thoughts on Goal III of the ONC HealthIT Strategic Plan, HEALTHCARE 
SECURITY/PRIVACY BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011), http://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2011/03/ 
thoughts-on-goal-iii-of-onc-healthit.html. 
 140 FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 52. 
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 142 Id. 
 143 Id. For instance, if hashes are obtained from key operating system binaries when the 
system is first installed, the hashes can be compared to subsequently obtained hashes to 
determine whether any binaries were changed. Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. To protect against that attack, “salt,” or additional bits, are added to the password 
before encryption. The addition of these bits forces attackers to increase the dictionary to 
include all possible additional bits, thereby making it more difficult to crack the password. Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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must be recognized by the creator key in order for the data to be converted into a 
digestible form.
150
 
Encryption is not a cure all security solution and can in fact weaken a system’s 
security if used inappropriately.
151
 For example, security measures which require the 
regular scanning of network data (i.e., anti-virus software) can be frustrated by 
encryption.
152
 Thus, viruses embedded in encrypted data can go undetected.
153
 
Encryption also raises the specter of data becoming unavailable should any 
irregularities occur in data handling or delivery.
154
 This presents a substantial risk in 
the health care context. If a financial institution is unable to access encrypted data, 
the user may suffer inconvenience or, at worst, lose some money. If a health care 
emergency medical provider is unable to access an EHR to discover a drug allergy, 
that inconvenience could cost a life. 
IV.  PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 
Based on this review of current regulations, one of the key distinctions between 
authentication security regulation in the financial and health care industries is the 
level of guidance provided to covered entities. HIPAA has provided more vague 
concepts of what is or is not appropriate, but without a more detailed analytical 
structure the process of risk analysis quickly devolves into a guessing game with 
harsh consequences for wrong answers.
155
 
The complexities and practical realities of health care information technology 
cannot serve as a deterrent or excuse for failing to provide clearer security standards. 
Specifically, the financial sector appears to have a much clearer picture of what the 
minimum standards, or “ground floor,” expectations are for authentication measures. 
By setting a more sophisticated ground floor of security in healthcare systems, many 
of the recent attacks on healthcare entities by hackers could have been avoided. 
                                                          
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 51. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id..  
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 155 See 78 C.F.R. § 5582 (2013). 
In adopting the HITECH Act's penalty scheme, the Department recognized that 
section 13410(d) contained apparently inconsistent language (i.e., its reference to two 
penalty tiers “for each violation,” each of which provided a penalty amount “for all 
such violations” of an identical requirement or prohibition in a calendar year). To 
resolve this inconsistency, with the exception of violations due to willful neglect that 
are not timely corrected, the IFR adopted a range of penalty amounts between the 
minimum given in one tier and the maximum given in the second tier for each 
violation and adopted the amount of $1.5 million as the limit for all violations of an 
identical provision of the HIPAA rules in a calendar year. For violations due to willful 
neglect that are not timely corrected, the IFR adopted the penalty amount of $50,000 
as the minimum for each violation and $1.5 million for all such violations of an 
identical requirement or prohibition in a calendar year. 
 
Id. 
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Perhaps just as important, clearer standards would allow the Office of Civil Rights to 
more effectively enforce those standards.
156
 
The question then necessarily becomes, “what should be the ground floor?” The 
most direct way to address this problem is to raise the baseline security standards for 
encryption and authentication security. These new encryption and authentication 
security standards must be set forth in a way that is consistent with the flexible 
framework that currently pervades HIPAA. This will necessarily require a balancing 
between providing strict standards and allowing covered entities adequate discretion 
to implement those standards in a manner that suits their needs and resources. 
The first proposed amendment is changing encryption of ePHI from an 
“addressable” measure to a “required” measure. Covered entities who utilize 
networked devices, that is, devices that are capable of transmitting ePHI over the 
internet, would be required to encrypt that data to ensure the data cannot be viewed 
by a hacker who gains remote access to the server. This is the most effective security 
framework available and is consistent with the other major proposed amendment that 
requires three-step authentication. 
Some covered entities may argue that an encryption requirement is overly 
burdensome. This is in part a concern about the strain encryption can place on a 
computer’s processing speed. While this may be a concern for older computers, 
modern technology is trending toward more efficient processing that makes 
encryption more affordable.157 Further, HHS already recommends encryption 
utilization as a way to ensure compliance with security requirements.158 HHS also 
notes that smaller to mid-size practices are specifically being targeted by hackers 
because they tend to adopt only the bare minimum of security requirements.159 By 
making encryption an essential part of all EHR software, hackers will have to look 
elsewhere to gain easy access to sensitive personal information. When encryption is 
already the industry norm, and technology is moving to support EHR encryption, 
there appears little chance of a technological retreat in encryption technology. The 
most logical step is to establish encryption as a basic element of EHR security by 
requiring all covered entities to utilize it. 
The second proposed amendment is to “require” three-step authentication to 
access ePHI. HHS has already “strongly encouraged” three-step authentication to 
protect HER, and three-step authentication is required in the financial industry.160 
Three-step authentication also utilizes a PKI framework that has proven to be the 
most effective at preventing unauthorized intrusions. 
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At first glance, requiring three-step authentication may seem inconsistent with 
the flexible standards throughout HIPAA. Three-step authentication is a more strict 
requirement than merely any “reasonable and appropriate measure,” but it still 
allows for considerable discretion in determining the level of sophistication a 
covered entity could implement. As outlined in the previous section, current banking 
regulations allow financial institutions to choose from two of three general means of 
authentication: (1) something the user knows, (2) something the user has, and (3) 
something the user “is.” By leaving it up to the covered entity to decide which two 
means to implement, the costs and burdens associated with a three-step 
authentication system become very flexible. For example, a large covered entity with 
huge stores of ePHI and sophisticated resources could require both a password and 
biometric authentication, such as fingerprint or retinal scans, to access its network. A 
smaller practice can opt for the much simpler and cost-effective password and key 
card combination. 
With any increased security standard there is a legitimate concern that healthcare 
providers will be forced to divert valuable time and monetary resources away from 
patient care and into compliance efforts. But increased security standards do not 
necessarily distract providers from their primary role as caregivers. In fact, third-
party EHR vendors, not providers, will bear most of the burden of these proposed 
changes. A recent survey by Software Advice, a group which conducts consumer 
research on software products, revealed that just five EHR software vendors enjoy an 
eighty-five percent market share among outpatient physicians who utilize EHR 
technology.161 The largest provider, Epic, provided roughly twenty percent of 
outpatient EHR software.162 The Epic website states that 760,000 patient records are 
exchanged each month on its servers.163 Given this concentration of market share, 
compliance with the regulations will primarily fall on these few major EHR vendors 
who specialize in information technology security and are in the best position to 
implement the new requirements across the industry. 
Finally, if quality patient care is the ultimate goal of healthcare, then the costs 
associated with raising security standards for encryption and authentication under 
HIPAA are outweighed by the increase in consumer trust that will follow 
implementation. As noted earlier, there is still considerable skepticism among 
patients about the overall security of EHR technology.164 That skepticism can have a 
negative impact on the trust relationship between a provider and patient. The level of 
trust a patient has in his or her provider has been linked to the overall quality of 
care.165 Bringing HIPAA security standards into the twenty-first century 
demonstrates to healthcare consumers that their ePHI security is taken seriously and 
that EHR technology should be a source of promise, not fear. 
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Given the above analysis, the following are proposed modifications to current 
HIPAA technical safeguards provided in 45 C.F.R. § 164.312. These new minimum 
standards can achieve needed security minimums without overly burdening EHR 
developers or the health care providers, and patients who utilize EHRs. 
45 C.F.R. § XXXX 
 § XXXX Definitions 
As used in this part, the following terms have the following meanings: 
(a) Authentication: A system, technology, or process that ensures the 
integrity, security, and authenticity of electronic transactions of 
Protected Health Information conducted via an unsecured, public 
network. 
(b) Protected Health Information: includes individually identifiable 
health information  
(1)  That is: 
         (i) Transmitted by electronic media; 
         (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or 
         (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. 
(2)  Protected health information excludes individually identifiable                          
       health information: 
(i)   In education records covered by the Family Educational      
       Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; 
(ii)  In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); 
(iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as  
      employer; and 
(iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50  
       years. 
(c) Electronic Protected Health Information: means information that 
comes within (1)(i), (1) (ii), or (1)(iii) of this section. 
(d) Transaction: means the transmission of information between two 
parties to carry out financial or administrative activities related to health 
care. It includes the following types of information transmissions: 
(1)   Health care claims or equivalent encounter information. 
(2) Health care payment and remittance advice. 
(3) Coordination of benefits. 
(4) Health care claim status. 
(5) Enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan. 
(6) Eligibility for a health plan. 
(7) Health plan premium payments. 
(8) Referral certification and authorization. 
(9) First report of injury. 
(10) Health claims attachments. 
(11) Other transactions that the Secretary may prescribe by regulation. 
(e) Implementation specification: means specific requirements or 
instructions for implementing a standard. 
 
§ 164.312 Technical Safeguards. 
A covered entity must: 
(a) 
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(1) Standard: Access control. Implement technical policies and 
procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic 
protected health information to allow access only to those persons or 
software programs that have been granted access rights. 
(2) Implementation specifications: 
(i)   Unique user identification (Required). Assign a unique name    
       and/or number for identifying and tracking user identity. 
(ii)  Emergency access procedure (Required). Establish (and  
       implement as needed) procedures for obtaining necessary          
       electronic protected health information during an emergency. 
(iii) Automatic logoff (Required). Implement electronic procedures        
       that terminate an electronic session after a predetermined time         
       of inactivity. 
(iv) Encryption and decryption (Required). Implement a  
       mechanism to encrypt and decrypt electronic protected health  
       information. 
(b) Standard: Audit controls. Implement hardware, software, and/or 
procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information 
systems that contain or use electronic protected health information. 
(c) 
(1) Standard: Integrity. Implement policies and procedures to protect        
      electronic protected health information from improper alteration or  
            destruction. 
(2) Implementation specification: Mechanism to authenticate  
     electronic protected health information (Required). Implement  
      electronic mechanisms to corroborate that electronic protected  
health information has not been altered or destroyed in an  
unauthorized manner. 
(d) Standard: Person or entity authentication. Implement procedures to 
verify that a person or entity seeking access to electronic protected health 
information is the one claimed. 
(1) Implementation specification: Authentication must utilize a three- 
     factor methodology, that includes at least two of the following: 
(i)   Something the user knows (i.e., a password) 
(ii)  Something the user has (i.e., a magnetic identification card) 
(iii) Something the is (i.e., a biometric feature such a retinal scan or  
      fingerprint) 
(2) Implementation Specification Public Key Infrastructure  
Authentication (addressable): PKI authentication is the preferred 
means for authenticating the transmission of all electronic 
Protected Health Information over a non-secure network. PKI 
should consist of: 
(i)   A certificate of authority (CA) that both issues and verifies the  
       digital certificates; 
(ii)  A registration authority which verifies the identity of users  
                  requesting information from the CA; 
(iii) A central directory—i.e. a secure location in which to store  
       and index keys; 
(iv) A certificate management system; and 
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(v)  A certificate policy. 
(e) 
(1) Standard: Transmission security. Implement technical security  
measures to guard against unauthorized access to electronic 
protected health information that is being transmitted over an 
electronic communications network consistent with  
§ 164.312(d)(2). 
(2) Implementation specifications: 
(i)  Integrity controls (Required). Implement security measures to  
            ensure that electronically transmitted electronic protected   
            health information is not improperly modified without         
            detection until disposed of. 
(ii) Encryption (Required). Implement a mechanism to encrypt  
electronic protected health information whenever electronic 
protected health information is transmitted via a public non-
secure network. 
(iii) Assymetric encryption (Addressable): mathematically related  
but distinct public keys and private keys should be used for 
encryption of electronic protected health information, in 
accordance with § 164.312(d)(2) and otherwise whenever 
appropriate. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Mobile technology and remote access to ePHI are now the norm in the medical 
field. The many advantages of remote access, such as convenience and improved 
integration of care, are counterbalanced by increased risk that unauthorized users 
will gain access to that information. While heightened regulation cannot stop all 
intrusions into ePHI, it can make it harder for hackers to gain access to patient 
information by raising the baseline standard for security across the industry. While 
current legislation encourages the adoption of some basic security measures, such as 
encryption and multi-layer authentication, it fails to make them outright 
requirements. 
If the healthcare industry is going to move into the twenty-first century, and 
realize the dramatic potential of widespread EHR adoption, it must first catch up to 
the security norms that prevail in the modern technological landscape. The industry 
cannot afford to ease into security by allowing covered entities to utilize outdated 
and ineffective security measures until they self-determine that it is reasonable and 
appropriate to adopt security technology that is already the norm in a comparable 
industry. 
The changes proposed in this Note are already basic requirements in the financial 
sector where personal financial information is regularly transmitted. These changes 
would implement the same basic level of security across the healthcare industry, 
while still recognizing the need for individual discretion among covered entities in 
determining what measures best fit their needs and budget. These heightened 
security standards would not only bring the healthcare industry in line with the 
comparable financial industry, but would help improve consumer confidence in 
providers that utilize this valuable technology. 
